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Abstract
We study the fundamental problem of selling a single indivisible item to one of n buyers
with independent and potentially nonidentical value distributions. We focus on two simple and
widely used selling mechanisms: the second price auction with eager personalized reserve prices
and the sequential posted price mechanism. Using a new approach, we improve the best-known
performance guarantees for these mechanisms. We show that for every value of the number
of buyers n, the eager second price (ESP) auction and sequential posted price mechanisms
respectively earn at least 0.6620 and 0.6543 fractions of the optimal revenue. We also provide
improved performance guarantees for these mechanisms when the number of buyers is small,
which is the more relevant regime for many applications of interest. This in particular implies
an improved bound of 0.6543 for free-order prophet inequalities.
Motivated by our improved revenue bounds, we further study the problem of optimizing
reserve prices in the ESP auctions when the sorted order of personalized reserve prices among
bidders is exogenous. We show that this problem can be solved polynomially. In addition,
by analyzing a real auction dataset from Google’s advertising exchange, we demonstrate the
effectiveness of order-based pricing.
Introduction
One of the most fundamental problems in auction/economic theory is selling a single indivisible item
to one of n buyers with independent and possibly heterogeneous value distributions. Optimizing the
performance of this auction has remarkable theoretical and practical impact. In online advertising
markets alone, such problems need to be solved every fraction of a second to decide what ads
to show to Internet users (WSJ 2017). An overwhelming majority of these decisions are made
via running eager second price (ESP) auctions (Chawla et al. 2014, Dhangwatnotai et al. 2015,
Paes Leme et al. 2016).1 Motivated by this, we seek to answer the following key question: What
fraction of optimal revenue can the ESP auction obtain?
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1In “eager” second price auctions, first the buyers that have not cleared their reserve prices are filtered. Subse-
quently, the winner is determined among non-filtered buyers. In contrast, in “lazy” second price auctions, first the
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
03
43
5v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
6 N
ov
 20
18
The first non-trivial performance guarantee for this auction was given by Chawla et al. (2010a),
who prove a 1− 1e approximation to the optimal revenue. They do so by proving the same approx-
imation for the sequential posted price mechanism (SPM) and making the important connection
that the same approximation factor carries over to the ESP auction that uses the posted prices
as personalized reserve prices. The sequential posted price problem is another fundamental selling
mechanism studied in the mechanism design literature and is interesting in its own right. The
mechanism computes n prices, one per buyer (without soliciting any bids), and approaches each
buyer in descending order of prices to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer while the supply lasts. As
stated in Chawla et al. (2010a), there are several advantages to SPMs compared to a traditional
auction, explaining their ubiquitous presence (Holahan 2008): (i) SPMs have trivial game dynam-
ics: responding truthfully is a dominant strategy, i.e., a buyer purchases the item when his value
exceeds the posted price. (ii) These mechanisms satisfy strong notions of collusion resistance, like
group strategy-proofness: a buyer interested in helping another buyer has to decline an item with a
price below his value, thereby hurting his own utility. Considering these properties, characterizing
the revenue bounds of these robust mechanisms is independently worthy of study.
Since the result of Chawla et al. (2010a), the 1 − 1e approximation
(
or, more generally, the
1−(1− 1n)n approximation when the number of buyers is n
)
for the SPM was found to be obtainable
with various techniques: pipage rounding (Calinescu et al. 2011), correlation gap (Agrawal et al.
(2012) and Yan (2011)), prophet secretary (Esfandiari et al. 2017) and Bernoulli selection lemma
(Correa et al. 2017a). The first improvement over this bound was due to the work of Azar et al.
(2017), who show how to improve 1− (1− 1n)n to 1− 1e + 1/400 for n ≥ 74. For smaller values of
n, 1− (1− 1n)n has remained the best known bound until our current paper.
We now summarize our main contributions.
Improved Revenue Bounds. We provide an improved universal bound over 1 − (1 − 1n)n
(i.e., valid for any number of buyers n) for both SPMs and ESP auctions. In particular, for SPMs
and ESP auctions, we prove improved approximations of 0.6543 and 0.6620 to the optimal revenue,
respectively. While the universal bounds of 0.6543 and 0.6620 are pessimistic (they are obtained
when n goes to infinity), they are useful in settings where either there is significant uncertainty in
the number of buyers, or the number of buyers is rather large.
The approximation factors are noticeably larger for smaller values of n. Table 1 presents our
improved bounds for n = 1, 2, . . . , 10 along with the value of 1− (1− 1n)n for comparison. We stress
that, thanks to our novel proof techniques, our bounds are valid even if the distributions of buyers’
value are irregular. The table shows that for SPMs and ESP auctions, our approach outperforms
the bound of 1 − (1 − 1n)n by up to 3% and 4%, respectively. We note that for the motivating
application of display advertising markets, the number of buyers in each auction is typically small,
and therefore, improvement for small n is particularly relevant.
We want to highlight that our ESP auction results are strictly better than our SPM results,
i.e., we do not just invoke the result of Chawla et al. (2010a) to reduce ESP auctions to SPM, but
also use some properties specific to ESP auctions to get these better bounds. Prior to this work,
the SPM approximation ratio always matched the ESP approximation ratio (including in the work
of Azar et al. (2017)), as they all invoke Chawla et al. (2010a) for ESP auction to SPM reduction.
Novel Proof Techniques. To establish our revenue bound for both SPMs and ESP auctions,
we consider the best of the two pricing rules: Uniform and Myersonian. In the uniform pricing
buyer with the highest submitted bid is chosen as the potential winner. Then, this buyer is announced as the winner
if his bid exceeds his reserve price.
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n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 10
1− (1− 1/n)n 1.0000 0.7500 0.7037 0.6836 0.6723 0.6651 0.6601 0.6564 0.6536 0.6513
SPM 1.0000 0.7586 0.7168 0.6990 0.6891 0.6828 0.6785 0.6753 0.6728 0.6709
ESP 1.0000 0.7611 0.7210 0.7040 0.6946 0.6887 0.6846 0.6815 0.6792 0.6774
Table 1: Revenue bounds of our mechanisms for different number of buyers. All numbers are rounded up.
rule, the mechanisms post the same price for every buyer. In the Myersonian pricing rule, the
mechanisms aim to imitate the optimal mechanism proposed by Myerson (1981). We apply the
simple concept of the taxation principle, which enables one to view any deterministic incentive-
compatible mechanism as a posted price mechanism for each buyer, with the price being dependent
on the bids of other buyers.2 In particular, we use the fact that any deterministic incentive-
compatible mechanism, including the optimal Myerson’s mechanism,3 can be seen as posting a
price for each buyer, where the price is a function of other buyers’ bids.
Taking inspiration from this fact, the Myersonian pricing rule computes a price for each buyer
i by sampling the bids of other buyers j 6= i from their respective distributions and then computes
the posted price that Myerson’s mechanism would have come up with given these bids from other
buyers. We perform fresh and independent sampling while computing the prices for different
buyers. Thus, while the prices from Myerson’s mechanism are highly correlated, the prices that we
compute are independent of each other, easing our analysis. Having considered the best of uniform
and Myersonian pricing rules, we then show our improved revenue bound by constructing novel
factor revealing linear programs (LPs).
Optimal Order-Based Eager Reserve Prices. While the discussion so far focused on
obtaining improved revenue bounds via simple reserve pricing schemes, the question of computing
the optimal vector of reserve prices for independent value distributions is still open.4 In this
paper, we make some progress towards answering this important question. We develop a dynamic
programming method to show that if we are given a sorted ordering over the personalized reserve
prices among the buyers, the problem of computing the optimal vector of personalized reserve prices
obeying that order can be done in polynomial time. Besides being a relevant subproblem to the
problem of computing optimal personalized reserve prices5, order-based optimal reserves can be
interesting in their own right. For example, in display advertising markets, web publishers may be
willing to treat certain buyers more preferentially than other buyers due to long-term relationships.
In ESP auctions, this would amount to giving smaller reserve prices for the more preferred buyers.
Another motivation for this problem is to develop a new method to improve prior pricing heuristics
such as Myerson’s monopoly reserve prices or those proposed by Paes Leme et al. (2016), Ronen
(2001), and Roughgarden and Wang (2016). In particular, ESP auctions can obtain the order
over reserve prices from one of these several heuristics and optimize its revenue subject to this
2In our proof, we do not invoke virtual values at all.
3Myerson’s mechanism, even for irregular distributions, where it is usually thought to be randomized, can be
implemented as a deterministic mechanism by breaking ties consistently (e.g. lexicographically) between buyers.
See Chawla and Sivan (2014).
4For the correlated value distribution, Paes Leme et al. (2016) show that the problem of optimizing reserve prices
in ESP auctions is NP-complete.
5For example, for small values of n, enumerating over all the n! orderings of reserve prices to find the truly optimal
vector of reserve prices is possible.
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order. This is the first work that compares the performance of various prominent reserve pricing
heuristics in a very data rich real world environment, besides proposing a practical technique to
improve them.
Empirical and Numerical Studies. We evaluate the performance of order-based ESP auc-
tions on synthetic and fully-anonymized real auction datasets from Google’s advertising exchange.
We present results for synthetic data so that our results are replicable, and the real auction dataset
enables us to assess our order-based ESP auctions in a realistic environment that does not neces-
sarily satisfy our independency assumption. Specifically, we show that although submitted bids in
our dataset are not independent across buyers, the order-based ESP auctions perform really well.
We investigate the performance of the ESP auctions that obey the order of prices in the four
main pricing heuristics from the literature: Myerson’s monopoly reserve prices and the respective
pricing heuristics proposed by Paes Leme et al. (2016), Ronen (2001), and Roughgarden and Wang
(2016). We note that to the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first work that compares
these heuristics in a realistic environment6 and provides a practical technique to improve them.
We further study the performance of the order-based ESP auctions that follow the order of the
average and coefficient of variation (CV) of the submitted bids. These orderings are motivated by
Golrezaei et al. (2017), who show that to extract more revenue from buyers, the mechanism should
favor buyers with smaller CVs and average bids. We show that by obeying the order suggested by
the prior pricing heuristics and optimizing reserve prices subject to the order, the revenue of ESP
auctions increases by up to 8.75%. In addition, we show that ordering based on the average and
CV of submitted bids performs well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we review the related literature. In
Section 2, we present our model, and we formally define SPMs and ESP auctions. Sections 3 and
4 present our universal revenue bounds for SPMs and ESP auctions. In Section 5, we provide our
revenue bounds that take into account the number of buyers n. Sections 6 and 7 are respectively
dedicated to the order-based reserve price optimization problem and our empirical studies. For the
sake of brevity, we only include proofs of selected results in the main text; the detailed proofs of
the rest of the statements are deferred to the appendix.
1 Related Work
Our work relates and contributes to the literature on optimal auction design. The seminal work
of Myerson (1981) shows that when buyers’ value distributions are regular and homogeneous, the
optimal mechanism can be implemented via a second price auction with reserve. However, the
structure of the optimal mechanism can be complex when the value distributions are heterogeneous
and irregular (Myerson 1981). Because of this, several papers have studied simpler auction formats,
such as second price auctions with (personalized) reserve prices (Hartline and Roughgarden (2009),
Paes Leme et al. (2016), Roughgarden and Wang (2016), and Allouah and Besbes (2018)), boosted
second price auctions (Golrezaei et al. 2017), the BIN-TAC mechanism (Celis et al. 2014), and first
price auctions (Bhalgat et al. 2012), to name a few.
Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) study the question of approximating the optimal revenue via
a Vickrey auction with personalized reserve prices, and show that for regular distributions, the
second price auction with so-called monopoly reserve prices yields a 2-approximation for regular
6We observe that the pricing heuristic of Paes Leme et al. (2016) outperforms the other aforementioned heuristics.
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distributions, and that for irregular distributions, no constant factor approximation is possible
with the monopoly reserves. Paes Leme et al. (2016) consider second price auctions and study the
question of computing the optimal personalized reserve prices in a correlated distribution setting,
and they show that the problem is NP-complete. Roughgarden and Wang (2016) show that this
problem is APX-hard for correlated distributions and give a 12 -approximation. Finally, Golrezaei
et al. (2017)—using empirical and theoretical analyses—show that when buyers are heterogeneous,
their proposed mechanism, called boosted second price auction, gets a high fraction (more than 12)
of the optimal revenue and outperforms the second price auction with reserve. In the current work,
we provide an improved approximation factor for second price auctions and show that this auction
format, despite its simple structure, performs well even when the distributions are heterogeneous
and irregular.
Our work is also related to the literature on prophet inequalities (Krengel and Sucheston (1977,
1978) and Kennedy (1987)). Specifically, studying posted price mechanisms has been intimately
connected to the work on prophet inequalities. In the classic prophet inequality setting, n indepen-
dent (but not necessarily identical) random variables arrive in an adversarial sequence, and after
each random variable arrives, the gambler faces two choices: accept the random variable and stop,
or reject and continue. The objective is to maximize the expected value of the random variable
selected by the gambler. Performance is measured based on the ratio of the gambler’s choice to the
expected value of the maximum of n random variables (the objective that a prophet with complete
foresight can obtain).
Adversarial Prophets. Hill and Kertz (1981) show that when variables are independent but
not identical and their orders are chosen adversarially, the gambler can obtain at least 12 of the
expected value obtained by a prophet; see also Samuel-Cahn (1984).7 This 12 -approximation was
later used by Chawla et al. (2010a) to give a 12 -approximation for the posted prices mechanism
when the buyers arrive in an adversarial order. When the random variables are i.i.d. and their
orders are adversarial, Hill and Kertz (1982) show that the gambler can obtain at least 1 − 1e of
the prophet’s value and also show examples that prove that one cannot obtain a factor beyond
1
1.342 ∼ 0.745. Kertz (1986) later conjecture that 11.342 ∼ 0.745 is the best possible approximation.
The first formal proof that one can go beyond 1 − 1e was given by Abolhassani et al. (2017), who
give 0.738 for all n beyond a certain constant n0. Simultaneously and independently, Correa et al.
(2017a) show a 0.745 approximation for this problem, thereby completely closing the gap. We
highlight that the 0.745 approximation factor proved by Correa et al. (2017a) is not applicable to
our setting, as in our work, the values of buyers are not i.i.d.
Free-Order Prophets. In another variation of prophet inequalities, the gambler can pick the
random variables in her desired order. This variation is known as free-order prophets. We first
note, as recently shown by Correa et al. (2017b), that any approximation for SPMs implies the
same approximation for free-order prophets. The bound on the best possible approximation by
Kertz (1986) also holds for this setting. Chawla et al. (2010a) give a 1− 1e approximation for the
SPM problem. Recall that under SPMs, the seller approaches the buyers in decreasing order of
their prices. This bound of 1 − 1e was recently surpassed by Azar et al. (2017) to 1 − 1e + 0.0025,
7This constant cannot be improved, even if the prophet were allowed to use adaptive strategies and even if we make
large market assumptions, like each distribution occurring at least m times for any arbitrarily large m (Abolhassani
et al. 2017).
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and their bound also extends to random order prophets, in which the random variables arrive in a
uniformly random order. Our bound of 0.6543 ∼ 1− 1e + 0.022 for SPMs, which implies the same
bound for free-order prophets by the result of Correa et al. (2017b), is the best known bound for
free-order prophets so far. More precisely, just like for SPMs and ESP auctions, ours is the first
paper to go beyond the 1− (1− 1n)n bound for every n in the free-order prophets setting.
Posted Prices, Prophet Inequalities and Generalizations. The connection between prophet
inequalities and mechanism design was initiated by Hajiaghayi et al. (2007), who interpret the
prophet inequality algorithms as truthful mechanisms for online auctions. Chawla et al. (2008) give
a 4-approximation to the single-agent n-items unit-demand pricing problem, via upper bounding the
revenue of the multi-parameter setting by that of the single-item n-buyers single-parameter prob-
lem. Chawla et al. (2010a,b) further this connection, and develop constant fraction approximations
for several multi-parameter unit-demand settings, by establishing constant factor approximations
to the corresponding single-parameter posted price settings through connections to prophet in-
equalities. Yan (2011) makes a connection between the revenue of SPMs and correlation gap for
submodular functions (Agrawal et al. 2012). Chakraborty et al. (2010) develop a PTAS for comput-
ing the optimal adaptive and non-adaptive SPMs in a k-item single-parameter setting. Kleinberg
and Weinberg (2012) generalize the prophet inequalities result to the matroidal environment, and
use this to give improved approximations for the multi-parameter unit-demand mechanism design
problem. For other generalizations of posted prices and prophet inequalities to combinatorial set-
tings, see Du¨tting and Kleinberg (2015), Ehsani et al. (2018), Feldman et al. (2015), Rubinstein
and Singla (2017), and Du¨tting et al. (2017).
2 Model
There is a single indivisible item to be sold to one of n buyers indexed by i ∈ [n], where [n] =
{1, 2, . . . , n}. The value of buyer i for the item, denoted by vi, is drawn independently from
distribution Fi with density function fi. For each i ∈ [n], distribution Fi is public information,
while value vi is buyer i’s private information.
In the following, we formally define the sequential posted price mechanisms, denoted by SPM(p),
and we then proceed to define the eager second price auctions, denoted by ESP(p). Here, p =
(p1, p2, . . . , pn) is a vector of posted prices in SPM(p) and a vector of reserve prices in ESP(p).
Before presenting these mechanisms, we note that in this work, we focus on the eager second
price auctions. The lazy second price auctions are incomparable to the eager second price auctions
for general correlated distributions but are within a factor of 2 of each other (Paes Leme et al.
2016). Further, Paes Leme et al. (2016) show that the optimal revenue from the eager auction
dominates the optimal revenue from the lazy auction when the value distributions are independent.
Motivated by this, we study ESP auctions in the current work. We note that it is known from an
example in Ronen (2001) that it is impossible to obtain a better than 1/2-approximation for the
lazy auctions with respect to the optimal revenue.
Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms SPM(p)
- Buyers are sorted in decreasing order of their posted prices pi, i ∈ [n]. Without loss of
generality, we assume that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn.
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- The mechanism approaches buyers in decreasing order of their posted prices. Precisely, for
i ∈ [n], the mechanism offers price pi to buyer i. If the buyer accepts the offer, i.e., vi ≥ pi,
the item will be allocated to buyer i at a price of pi, and the mechanism will stop. Otherwise,
the mechanism proceeds to the next buyer with the highest posted price, i.e., buyer i+ 1.
Eager Second Price Auctions ESP(p)
- Each buyer i ∈ [n] submits his bid/value vi.8
- All the buyers with value vi < pi are first eliminated. Let S = {i : vi ≥ pi} be the set of all
the buyers who clear their reserve prices.
- The item is then allocated to buyer i? = arg maxi∈S vi, who has the highest value among all
buyers in set S, and he pays max(pi? , maxi∈S,i6=i? vi). For other buyers, their payment is zero.
The following lemma is an important observation about the revenue of ESP(p) and SPM(p)
mechanisms made by Chawla et al. (2010a). Note that the revenue of a mechanism is the total
(expected) payment that it charges the buyers, where the expectation is taken with respect to the
randomness in buyers’ value.
Lemma 1 (ESP Dominates SPM). For any vector of prices p = (p1, . . . , pn) and any value distri-
butions, the revenue of ESP(p) is at least the revenue of SPM(p).
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1: For any realization of buyers’ value, if SPM(p) has a winner, then
ESP(p) must also have a winner. If the winner in the two auctions is the same, then the revenue
of ESP(p) must be at least as large as that of SPM(p). If the winner is different, then the winner
of ESP(p) is paying at least the bid of the winner in SPM(p), and the latter is at least the posted
price in SPM(p). 
Throughout the proof, with a slight abuse of notation, we respectively denote the expected
revenue of ESP(p) and SPM(p) by ESP(p) and SPM(p), where the expectation is taken with
respect to the randomness in the buyers’ value.
2.1 Optimal Revenue Benchmark
Our benchmark, which we refer to as Opt, is an incentive-compatible (truthful) and individually
rational revenue-optimal auction in the independent value setting. This mechanism was designed
by Myerson (1981). For most of our results, the specific form of the optimal auction is irrelevant.
We will use only the fact that it is a deterministic truthful auction, and hence, the taxation principle
(Hammond 1979) gives a simple equivalent form of expressing such a mechanism. As mentioned
earlier, even when the distributions are not regular, Myerson’s mechanism can be implemented as
a deterministic mechanism; see Chawla and Sivan (2014).
The following lemma describes the taxation principle in any deterministic truthful mechanism.
We do not prove it here: its proof can be derived from any standard auction theory text.
8Since ESP auctions are truthful, buyers’ bids are equal to their values.
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Lemma 2 (Taxation Principle). Given a single-item deterministic truthful mechanism M, there
are threshold functions ti(v−i) for each buyer i, depending only on the bids of the other buyers
v−i = (vj)j 6=i, such that the allocation and payment of mechanism M can be described as follows:
• if vi > ti(v−i), then the item is allocated to buyer i, and he is charged the threshold ti(v−i).
• if vi = ti(v−i), then either the item is allocated to buyer i, and he is charged his value
vi = ti(v−i), or the item is not allocated to him, and he is not charged.
• if vi < ti(v−i), then the item is not allocated to buyer i, and he is not charged.
We note that the threshold functions ti’s can be computed for any deterministic incentive-
compatible mechanism. In such a mechanism, each buyer i has a critical value vmin—which only
depends on other buyers’ values—such that he gets allocated and pays vmin if his value vi > vmin.
When vi < vmin, he does not get allocated and pays 0. When vi = vmin, the mechanism can either
allocate the item to buyer i and charge him vmin, or not allocate the item to him and charge 0.
The threshold function is defined as ti(v−i) = vmin. We give two examples to illustrate how these
thresholds are computed.
Example 3. Second price auction with no reserve: The critical value for buyer i is ti(v−i) =
maxj 6=i vj.
Example 4. Optimal auction with uniform distributions: Suppose that there are two buyers
with values v1 and v2 drawn independently from the uniform distributions in [0,1] and [0,2], respec-
tively. In the optimal auction, the item is allocated to the buyer with the highest non-negative virtual
value.9 The virtual values of buyers 1 and 2 are respectively 2v1−1 and 2v2−2. Thus, buyer 1 is al-
located when v1 ≥ max(0.5, v2−0.5), and buyer 2 is allocated when v2 ≥ max(1, v1+0.5). Therefore,
the threshold functions are given by t1(v2) = max(0.5, v2 − 0.5) and t2(v1) = max(1, v1 + 0.5).
Thresholds, ti(v−i), are constructed in such a way that at most one buyer is strictly above his
threshold. However, it is possible that more than one buyer is at the threshold, in which case a
tie-breaking rule needs to be determined to exactly describe the allocation rule of the mechanism.
There are two important cases in which the issues of tie breaking can be ignored. The first case
is when the value distributions are independent and continuous, with no atoms: in this case, the
probability that vi = ti(v−i) is zero. The second case is when the distributions have a finite discrete
support: here, the thresholds for any deterministic auction can be constructed in such a way that
there will be at most one buyer who meets/exceeds the threshold, i.e., vi ≥ ti(v−i), in which case
that buyer gets allocated and pays his threshold. To avoid issues with ties, throughout the paper,
we assume that distributions are discrete, and in such a case, thresholds are set in a manner such
that there is at most one buyer who meets/exceeds the threshold in the auction. The continuous
case can be handled by discretizing the distributions and taking the limit of the discretization.
2.2 Definitions and Notations
Thresholds: In the rest of the paper, ti(v−i) refers to the threshold of buyer i corresponding to
the optimal auction (see Lemma 2). Whenever it is clear from context, we abbreviate ti(v−i) or
the function ti(·) by ti.
9The virtual value of buyer i with value v is given by v − 1−Fi(v)
fi(v)
.
8
Re-sampled thresholds: We will often refer to the thresholds computed from independently
re-sampled values: namely, for each buyer i, sample v′j,i ∼ Fj for all j 6= i, and denote by ti(v−i′)
the re-sampled threshold where v−i′ = (v′1,i, . . . , v
′
i−1,i, v
′
i+1,i, . . . , v
′
n,i). Observe that we do not
reuse samples: for each buyer i, we freshly re-sample the values of all other buyers. We abbreviate
ti(v−i′) by t′i whenever it is clear from the context. Note that although for each i, the distribution
of ti is the same as the distribution of t
′
i, t
′
i’s are independent across i’s, while ti’s are correlated.
Myersonian posted prices: This refers to the tuple of n posted prices, one per buyer, namely,
the re-sampled threshold t′i for buyer i.
Uniform posted price: This refers to the highest revenue yielding uniform posted price, namely,
p? = arg maxp p · P[maxi vi ≥ p].
Revenue lower bound probabilities: Let si(τ) = P[vi ≥ ti(v−i) ≥ τ ], i ∈ [n], be the
probability that buyer i wins and pays at least τ in the optimal auction, where the expectation is
taken w.r.t. v−i and vi. Further, let s(τ) =
∑
i∈[n] si(τ) be the probability that the winner pays at
least τ . It follows immediately that s(τ) is a weakly decreasing function whose integral defines the
optimal auction’s revenue:
Opt =
∫∞
0 s(τ)dτ . (1)
3 Universal Revenue Bound for Sequential Posted Price Mecha-
nisms
In this section, we provide a universal approximation factor for the SPMs that hold for any value
of n. We note that our approximation factor is valid even if value distributions are not regular.
Theorem 5 (Revenue Bound of SPM). There exists a vector of prices p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) such
that SPM(p) ≥ 0.6543 · Opt.
Relation to free-order prophets: We note that Theorem 5 also implies that an improved
bound of 0.6543 for the free-order prophet problem Correa et al. (2017b). In this problem, there
are n independent random variables Xi with known distributions Gi. A decision maker knows
the distributions but not the realizations and he chooses an order to inspect the variables. Upon
inspecting a variable, he learns its realized value and needs to choose between stopping and obtaining
its value as a reward or abandoning that variable forever and continuing to inspect other variables.
An algorithm for this problem is a policy that determines an order to inspect the variables and
for each variable inspected decides whether to stop and obtain that reward or continue inspecting.
If I is the index of the random variable chosen by the decision maker, the performance of the
algorithm is E[XI ]. The goal is to compare the performance of the decision maker with a prophet
that knows all the values in advance and therefore can obtain E[max(X1, . . . , Xn)]. Correa et al.
(2017b) recently showed that this problem is equivalent to the sequential posted prices problem.
In particular, each variable Xi in the free-order prophet problem can be mapped to a buyer i with
value vi such that the virtual value associated with vi has distribution Gi. Then, they showed
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that one can solve the sequential posted prices problem for vi’s and then map the policy back to
a free-order prophet policy. Using this mapping, any algorithm for sequential posted prices can be
transformed (in a black-box manner) to an algorithm for the free-order prophets problem with the
same approximation ratio.
The proof of Theorem 5 is based on a novel technique that uses the the best of two posted
price mechanisms (and hence, the ultimate mechanism is also a posted price mechanism). The first
one, which we call the Myersonian posted price mechanism, posts prices that mimic the threshold
functions in the optimal auction, and the second one, called the uniform posted price mechanism,
posts the same price for every buyer. We show that choosing the best of these two mechanisms
gives us the desired bound.
Myersonian Posted Price Mechanism: Approach the buyers in decreasing order of their
Myersonian posted prices, i.e., the re-sampled thresholds t′i (defined in Section 2.2), and allocate to
the first buyer i whose value vi exceeds his threshold t
′
i. Recall that t
′
i’s are independent random
variables across i’s, and each t′i is distributed identically to ti. Let MP denote the expected revenue
of this mechanism, where the expectation is taken w.r.t. randomness in both the re-sampled posted
prices and the buyers’ values.
Uniform Posted Price Mechanism: Approach buyers in an arbitrary order, and allocate
to the first buyer whose value exceeds the price p? = arg maxp p · P[maxi vi ≥ p]. Let UP be the
expected revenue of this mechanism, where the expectation is taken with respect to the buyers’
values.
In Theorem 5, we show that max(UP,MP) is at least a 0.6543 fraction of the optimal revenue,
denoted by Opt. This implies that there exist thresholds p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) such that SPM(p) ≥
(1− 1e + 0.022)Opt ≈ 0.6543 · Opt.
We focus on the best of these two mechanisms because they complement each other, i.e., in
the worst instances of Myersonian pricing, uniform pricing has a good performance.10 We are now
ready to prove Theorem 5 by constructing a factor revealing LP: the proof immediately follows
from Claim 6.
Claim 6 (Detailed Statement of Theorem 5). The maximum of Myersonian Posted Price Mech-
anism’s and Uniform Posted Price Mechanism’s revenue is at least OptLP-SPM = 0.6543 · Opt, where
LP-SPM is defined as:
LP-SPM = max
{s(τ),τ≥0}
∫ ∞
0
s(τ)dτ
s.t. 0 ≤ s(τ) ≤ min(1, 1/τ) ∀ τ ≥ 0∫ ∞
0
s(τ)f(τ)dτ ≤ 1 , (LP-SPM)
where f(τ) = (1−e
−min(1,1/τ))
min(1,1/τ) .
10 To illustrate that UP complements MP, consider the setting where there are n buyers whose values are indepen-
dently drawn from the uniform distribution in [1, 1 + ] for a tiny . Then, the optimal auction is simply the second
price auction with a uniform reserve of 1, and the uniform pricing scheme that just posts a price of 1 gets very close to
this optimal auction. However, in the Myersonian posted price mechanism, each buyer is offered a random threshold
that is the maximum of n − 1 uniform variables. Thus, each buyer is above such a threshold with probability 1/n.
Since they are all independent, with probability (1 − 1/n)n → 1/e, no buyer is above the threshold. Thus, MP just
makes a 1− 1/e approximation for this particular choice of prices.
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Proof. Proof of Claim 6: We first show that max(MP,UP) ≥ 1LP-SPMOpt. Subsequently we prove
that 1LP-SPM = 0.6543.
Without loss of generality, assume that the revenue of the posted price mechanism that chooses
the best of uniform and Myersonian prices is normalized to 1: i.e., max(MP,UP) = 1 (this can be
done by scaling all values). Note that the objective function of LP-SPM is the optimal revenue (see
Equation (1)). Thus, proving that the constraints of Problem LP-SPM follow from upper/lower
bounds on UP,MP along with max(MP,UP) = 1 will imply that max(MP,UP) ≥ 1LP-SPMOpt. We
now show that the constraints follow from upper and lower bounds on UP, MP.
Upper Bounds on UP (First Set of Constraints): Consider the posted price mechanism
that posts a price of τ for every buyer. The revenue of this mechanism is equal to τ ·P[maxi vi ≥ τ ],
which is at least τs(τ). Therefore, UP ≥ τs(τ) for every τ ≥ 0; that is,
max
τ≥0
τs(τ) ≤ UP ≤ 1 , (2)
where the second inequality follows from max(MP,UP) = 1. Equation (2) leads to
0 ≤ s(τ) ≤ min(1, 1/τ) ∀τ ≥ 0 . (3)
In the inequality, we also used the fact that s(τ) is a probability and is at most 1. Note that
Equation (3) is the first set of constraints in LP-SPM.
Lower Bounds on MP (Second Constraint): Let m(τ) be the probability that the Myer-
sonian posted price mechanism sells with price at least τ , which is the probability that there is at
least one buyer with vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ , where t′i is the posted-price for buyer i in MP. Then, we have:
MP =
∫∞
0 m(τ)dτ ≤ 1 , (4)
where the inequality follows from max(MP,UP) = 1. Next, we present a lower bound on MP by
connecting m(τ) to probability s(τ) that describes the optimal auction.
By construction of t′i, the probability mi(τ) that vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ , is the same probability as buyer
i wins in the optimal auction and is charged at least τ , which is si(τ). Since the buyers’ values are
all independent, and the prices t′i are all computed independently with fresh re-sampling for each
buyer i, we have:
m(τ) = 1−∏ni=1(1− si(τ)) ≥ 1− e−∑ni=1 si(τ) = 1− e−s(τ) = s(τ)1−e−s(τ)s(τ) ≥ s(τ)f(τ) ,
(5)
where f(τ) = (1−e
−min(1,1/τ))
min(1,1/τ) . The first inequality follows from 1−x ≤ e−x and the last inequality
follows from 1−e
−x
x being decreasing in x and that s(τ) ≤ min(1, 1/τ) (see Equation (3)). Invoking
Equations (4) and (5) leads to the second constraint in LP-SPM.
Next, we compute the objective value LP-SPM. It is not difficult to guess the optimal solution
of Problem LP-SPM. Since f(τ) is increasing in τ , an optimal solution must satisfy that whenever
s(τ) > 0, it must be that s(τ ′) = min(1, 1/τ ′) for every τ ′ < τ . Hence, the optimal solution of
Problem LP-SPM has the following form:
s(τ) =
{
min(1, 1/τ) if 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ?;
0 if τ > τ? ,
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where τ? > 1 is the unique threshold for which
∫∞
0 s(τ)f(τ)dτ = 1. This leads to∫ ∞
0
s(τ)f(τ)dτ =
∫ 1
0
s(τ)f(τ)dτ +
∫ τ?
1
s(τ)f(τ)dτ = (1− e−1) +
∫ τ?
1
(1− e−1/τ )dτ = 1 .
By solving the above equation numerically, we get τ? = 1.696, and the optimal solution of Problem
LP-SPM is given by 1 + ln(τ?) = 1.5283. To see why note that∫ ∞
0
s(τ)dτ =
∫ 1
0
dτ +
∫ τ?
1
1
τ
dτ = 1 + ln(τ?) = 1.5283 .
Hence, the SPM that chooses the best of uniform and Myersonian pricing rule yields at least
1/1.5283 ≈ 0.6543 of Opt, which is the bound in Theorem 5. 
4 Universal Revenue Bound for Eager Second Price Auctions
The bound presented in Theorem 5 is also a valid bound for the ESP auctions; see Lemma 1.
However, the ESP auctions can potentially earn higher revenue than SPM by leveraging the second
highest bid. We now show how to exploit the second highest bid to obtain an improved bound for
the ESP auction.
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 7 (Revenue Bound of ESP). There exist reserve prices p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) such that
ESP(p) ≥ 0.6620 · Opt.
The proof, in spirit, is similar to that of Theorem 5. We consider an ESP auction that chooses
the best of Myersonian and Uniform reserve prices. We construct a factor revealing LP to bound
its performance.
Proof of Theorem 7
Similar to the proof of Theorem 5, we define the following two ESP auctions.
Myersonian ESP Auction: We run the ESP auction with personalized reserve prices for
each buyer, with buyer i facing the re-sampled threshold t′i as his reserve price (see the definition
in Section 2.2). Let ME denote the expected revenue of this auction.
Uniform ESP Auction: We run the ESP auction with a uniform reserve price of p?E =
arg maxp Ev∼∏i Fi [max(p, v(2)) · I[maxi vi ≥ p]], where v(2) is the second highest bid (which is also
equal to the second highest value in a truthful auction). We denote the revenue of this auction by
UE.
In the following claim, we show that the best of two aforementioned ESP auctions has the
approximation factor given in Theorem 7, concluding its proof.
Claim 8 (Detailed Statement of Theorem 7). For every positive integer k, the maximum of Myer-
sonian ESP Auction’s and Uniform ESP Auction’s revenue is at least 1LP-ESP(k) ·Opt, where si = i/k,
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for i ∈ [k], and
LP-ESP(k) = max
w
∑
i∈[k]
wi
s.t.
j∑
i=1
wi
2(1− e−si)− sie−si
si
+
k∑
i=j+1
wi
sj + (1− e−si)
si
≤ 2, ∀j ∈ [k]
∑
i∈[k]
wi
1− e−si
si
≤ 1
wi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [k]
(LP-ESP)
In particular, setting k = 3200, the approximation factor is 1LP-ESP(3200) = 0.6620.
The factor revealing LP, given in Claim 8, does not have a closed form solution. In the following
table, we present the value of LP-ESP(k) for different values of k. Since 1LP-ESP(k) is a valid approx-
imation factor for every k, it follows that 1LP-ESP(3200) = 0.6620 is a valid approximation factor. As
it becomes clear in the proof, parameter k determines the precision of our discretization. Larger
values of k imply more granular discretization.
k 50 100 200 400 800 1600 3200
1
LP-ESP(k)
0.6606 0.6613 0.6617 0.6618 0.6619 0.6620 0.6620
Table 2: 1
LP-ESP(k)
for different values of k.
Before presenting the proof of Claim 8, we briefly discuss LP-ESP. The objective of the problem
is the optimal revenue. Recall that by Equation (1), the optimal revenue is
∫∞
0 s(τ)dτ where s(τ)
is the probability that the optimal auction sells at a price at least τ . We define 0 = τk ≤ τk−1 ≤
. . . ≤ τ1 ≤ τ0 =∞ such that τj = inf{τ : s(τ) ≤ j/k}, j ∈ [k − 1]. We then have
Opt =
∑
i∈[k]
wi , where wi =
∫ τi−1
τi
s(τ)dτ . (6)
Equation (6) verifies that the objective function of Problem LP-ESP is Opt. Next, we explain the
constraints of the LP. The first set of constraints follows from lower and upper bounds on UE+ME.
The second constraint follows from bounding ME.
We now present the proof of Claim 8.
Proof. Proof of Claim 8: The goal is to show that max(UE,ME) ≥ 1LP-ESP(k) ·Opt. Similar to the
proof of Theorem 5, without loss of generality, let max(UE,ME) = 1. By the definition of wi’s, the
objective function of Problem LP-ESP is equal to Opt. This implies that to show Claim 8, it suffices
to prove that the constraints of Problem LP-ESP follow from upper/lower bounds on UE,ME and
max(UE,ME) = 1.
First Set of Constraints: To derive the first set of constraints, we use lower and upper
bounds on ME + UE. Let Tx = inf{τ : s(τ) ≤ x}, x ∈ [0, 1] (note that Tx is different from the
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τj = inf{τ : s(τ) ≤ j/k}, j ∈ [k − 1] defined earlier). In addition, with a slight abuse of notation,
let UEx be the revenue of the ESP auction that posts a uniform price of Tx for all buyers. By
definition of the uniform ESP auction, we have UE = maxx∈[0,1] UEx. We now bound ME + UEx
for any x ∈ [0, 1].
We start by bounding UEx. Define ux(τ) as the probability that ESP auction with uniform
price Tx sells with price at least τ . Then, UEx =
∫∞
τ=0 ux(τ)dτ . We next bound UEx via bounding
ux(τ).
For τ ≤ Tx, we bound ux(τ) via
ux(τ) ≥ s(Tx) ≥ x , τ ≤ Tx . (7)
This bound holds because (i) while the ESP auction with uniform price Tx can sell the item with
price at least τ if there exists at least one buyer i with value vi ≥ Tx, the optimal auction can
sell at price at least Tx only if there is at least one buyer i with vi ≥ ti(v−i) ≥ Tx, and as a
result, ux(τ) ≥ s(Tx), and (ii) by definition of Tx, we have s(Tx) ≥ x; to see this recall that
Tx = inf{τ : s(τ) ≤ x}. So when Tx ∈ {τ : s(τ) ≤ x}, by monotonicity of s(τ), it must be the
case that s(Tx) = x. Further, if Tx /∈ {τ : s(τ) ≤ x}, we have s(Tx) > x. Thus, s(Tx) ≥ x.
For τ > Tx we bound ux(τ) by noting that the ESP auction with uniform price Tx can sell at
price at least τ only if there are at least two buyers bidding above τ . Let Ẑτ be the cardinality of
set {i ∈ [n], vi ≥ τ} and Zτ be the cardinality of set {i ∈ [n], vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ}.
Then, we have:
ux(τ) = P[Ẑτ ≥ 2] ≥ P[Zτ ≥ 2] = 1− P[Zτ = 0]− P[Zτ = 1] , τ > Tx . (8)
Combining the bounds in (7) and (8), we get
UEx =
∫ ∞
τ=0
ux(τ)dτ ≥
∫ Tx
0
xdτ +
∫ ∞
Tx
(1− P[Zτ = 0]− P[Zτ = 1])dτ . (9)
We next bound ME. With a slight abuse of notation, let m(τ) be the probability that the
Myersonian ESP auction sells at price greater than or equal to τ . Then, by the definition of Zτ we
have
m(τ) = P[Zτ ≥ 1] ≥ 1− P[Zτ = 0] . (10)
Then, considering that ME =
∫∞
τ=0m(τ)dτ and by using Equations (9) and (10), we get
2 ≥ UEx + ME ≥
∫ Tx
0
(
x+ 1− P[Zτ = 0]
)
dτ +
∫ ∞
Tx
(2− 2P[Zτ = 0]− P[Zτ = 1])dτ , (11)
where the first inequality follows from our assumption that max(ME,UE) = 1. To simplify the r.h.s.
of (11), we make use of Lemma 9, stated at the end of this section, that says P[Zτ = 0] ≤ e−s(τ),
and P[Zτ = 0] + P[Zτ = 1] ≤ (2 + s(τ))e−s(τ).
By Equation (11) and Lemma 9, we get∫ Tx
0
(x+ (1− e−s(τ)))dτ +
∫ ∞
Tx
(2− 2e−s(τ) − s(τ)e−s(τ))dτ ≤ 2 . (12)
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The above equation holds for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Set x = j/k. Then, we have
2 ≥
∫ Tx
0
(x+ (1− e−s(τ)))dτ +
∫ ∞
Tx
(2− 2e−s(τ) − s(τ)e−s(τ))dτ
=
k∑
i=j+1
∫ τi−1
τi
(x+ (1− e−s(τ)))
s(τ)
s(τ)dτ +
j∑
i=1
∫ τi−1
τi
(2− 2e−s(τ) − s(τ)e−s(τ))
s(τ)
s(τ)dτ
≥
k∑
i=j+1
wi
x+ (1− e−si)
si
+
j∑
i=1
wi
(2− 2e−si − sie−si)
si
, (13)
where the equality follows from the definition of τj ’s and Tx, and the fact that at x = j/k, Tx = τj .
The second inequality follows from definition of wi’s and si’s, and the fact that y 7→ 1y (2−(2+y)e−y)
and y 7→ 1y (x + 1 − e−y) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] (for proof, see Lemma 10, which is stated at
the end of this section) and that s(τ) itself is a decreasing function. Then, since x = sj = j/k,
Equation (13) gives us the first set of constraints in Problem LP-ESP.
The Second Constraint: We now apply the same procedure to bound ME =
∫∞
τ=0m(τ)dτ .
By Equation (10), Lemma 9, and the fact that max(ME,UE) = 1, we have
1 ≥ ME =
∫ ∞
τ=0
m(τ)dτ ≥
∫ ∞
τ=0
1− e−s(τ)
s(τ)
s(τ)dτ ≥
k∑
i=1
wi
1− e−si
si
,
which results in the second constraint of Problem LP-ESP. 
Lemma 9. Let Zτ be the number of buyers with vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ ; that is, Zτ =
∣∣{i ∈ [n], vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ}∣∣.
Then,
P[Zτ = 0] ≤ qn(s(τ)) ≤ lim
n→∞ qn(s(τ)) = e
−s(τ) (14)
2P[Zτ = 0] + P[Zτ = 1] ≤ rn(s(τ)) ≤ lim
n→∞ rn(s(τ)) = (2 + s(τ))e
−s(τ) , (15)
where qn(y) =
(
1− yn
)n
and rn(y) = 2
(
1− yn
)n
+ y
(
1− yn
)n−1
.
Lemma 10. Functions y 7→ 1y (2− rn(y)) and y 7→ 1y (x+ 1− qn(y)) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] for
every positive integer n and every x ≥ 0, where qn(y) = (1− yn)n and rn(y) = 2(1− yn)n+y(1− yn)n−1.
In addition, functions y 7→ 1y (2 − (2 + y)e−y) and y 7→ 1y (x + 1 − e−y) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1]
and y ∈ [x, 1].11
Proofs of Lemmas 9, 10 are given in the appendix.
5 Revenue Bounds for a Finite Number of Buyers
The bounds presented in Theorems 5 and 7 hold for any number of buyers n. As stated earlier, in
online advertising markets, due to targeting and heterogeneous preference of buyers (advertisers),
the number of buyers is rather small. Inspired by this fact, in this section, we obtain improved
11Note that limn→∞ 1y (2− rn(y)) = 1y (2− (2 + y)e−y) and limn→∞ 1y (x+ 1− qn(y)) = 1y (x+ 1− e−y).
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bounds for the SPMs and ESP auctions when the number of buyers n is small. We use the same
ideas as in Theorems 5 and 7 to get these improvements, with the main new ingredient being the
usage of n-dependent bounds of Lemma 9, namely, qn(τ) and rn(τ), rather than the n-independent
limiting versions of these quantities used in Theorems 7.
In Figure 1, we illustrate our improved bounds for the SPMs and ESP auctions. We also depict
the best bound known for these mechanisms prior to this work, i.e., 1 − (1 − 1/n)n. As stated
earlier, this bound is due to Chawla et al. (2010a). We observe that our bound for the SPMs and
ESP auctions improves the prior bound by up to 3% and 4%, respectively. Further, the revenue
bounds increase as the number of buyers decreases. This justifies the widespread use of the ESP
auctions in advertising exchanges where the number of buyers in each auction is rather small.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Buyers (n)
1-1/e
0.65430.6620
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Figure 1: Comparing our bound with the best prior known bound for n = 2, . . . , 10. The red and green dashed curves
respectively present the bounds in Theorems 5 and Theorem 7. Recall that these bounds are valid for any n ≥ 1.
In this section, to highlight the dependency of our bounds on the number of buyers n, we denote
the revenue of SPMs and ESP auctions with vector of prices p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) by SPMn(p) and
ESPn(p), respectively. We further denote the optimal revenue by Optn.
5.1 Posted Price Mechanism
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 11 (SPM with a Finite Number of Buyers). There exist reserve prices p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
such that SPMn(p) ≥ Optn ·maxk ( 1LP-SPM(n,k)) for every positive integer k, where
LP-SPM(n, k) = max
w
∑
i∈[k]
wi
s.t.
k∑
i=j+1
wi
sj
si
≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [k − 1]
k∑
i=1
wi
1− qn(si)
si
≤ 1
wi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [k]
(LP-SPM-n)
Here, si = i/k, i ∈ [k], and qn(y) =
(
1− yn
)n
.
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The proof of Theorem 11 is similar to that of Theorem 7, and is provided in the appendix.
Table 3 shows 1LP-SPM(n,k) for n ∈ [10] and k = 200, 400, 800, and 1600. Here, again, k determines
the granularity of our discretization.
n k 1
LP-SPM(n,k)
n 1
LP-SPM(n,k)
n 1
LP-SPM(n,k)
n 1
LP-SPM(n,k)
n 1
LP-SPM(n,k)
1
200 1.0000
2
0.7585
3
0.7167
4
0.6988
5
0.6889
400 1.0000 0.7586 0.7168 0.6989 0.6890
800 1.0000 0.7586 0.7168 0.6990 0.6891
1600 1.0000 0.7586 0.7168 0.6990 0.6891
6
200 0.6826
7
0.6782
8
0.6750
9
0.6726
10
0.6706
400 0.6827 0.6784 0.6752 0.6727 0.6708
800 0.6828 0.6784 0.6752 0.6728 0.6708
1600 0.6828 0.6785 0.6753 0.6728 0.6709
Table 3: 1
LP-SPM(n,k)
for n ∈ [10] and k = 200, 400, 800, and 1600. For each n ∈ [10], the maximum value of 1
LP-SPM(n,k)
(among the k’s considered) is boldfaced.
5.2 Eager Second Price Mechanism
The following theorem presents our improved bounds for the ESP auction when the number of
buyers is n.
Theorem 12 (ESP with a Finite Number of Buyers). There exists a vector of reserve prices
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) such that ESPn(p) ≥ Optn ·maxk ( 1LP-ESP(n,k)) for every positive integer k,
where
LP-ESP(n, k) = max
w
∑
i∈[k]
wi
s.t.
j∑
i=1
wi
2− rn(si)
si
+
k∑
i=j+1
wi
sj + (1− qn(si))
si
≤ 2, ∀j ∈ [k]
k∑
i=1
wi
1− qn(si)
si
≤ 1
wi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [k]
(LP-ESP-n)
Here, si = i/k, i ∈ [k], qn(y) =
(
1− yn
)n
, and rn(y) = 2
(
1− yn
)n
+ y
(
1− yn
)n−1
.
The proof of Theorem 12 is similar to the proof of Theorem 7; thus it is omitted. The only
difference between the proofs is that here we provide tighter lower bounds for the revenue of the
Myersonian and uniform ESP auctions using Lemma 9. This lemma provides n-dependent and
n-independent bounds. The n-independent bounds, i.e., 2e−si + sie−si and e−si , were used in
Theorem 7 while the n-dependent bounds, i.e., rn(si) and qn(si), are used in Theorem 12 to obtain
an improved approximation factor. Observe that if in Problem LP-ESP-n, we replace rn(si) and
qn(si) respectively with 2e
−si + sie−si and e−si , we can recover Problem LP-ESP.
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To better understand Theorem 12, in Table 4, we present 1LP-ESP(n,k) for n ∈ [10] and k =
200, 400, 800, and 1600.
n k 1
LP-ESP(n,k)
n 1
LP-ESP(n,k)
n 1
LP-ESP(n,k)
n 1
LP-ESP(n,k)
n 1
LP-ESP(n,k)
1
200 1.0000
2
0.7610
3
0.7207
4
0.7038
5
0.6944
400 1.0000 0.7611 0.7209 0.7039 0.6945
800 1.0000 0.7611 0.7209 0.7040 0.6946
1600 1.0000 0.7611 0.7210 0.7040 0.6946
6
200 0.6884
7
0.6843
8
0.6813
9
0.6790
10
0.6771
400 0.6886 0.6844 0.6814 0.6791 0.6773
800 0.6886 0.6845 0.6815 0.6792 0.6774
1600 0.6887 0.6846 0.6815 0.6792 0.6774
Table 4: 1
LP-ESP(n,k)
for n ∈ [10] and k = 200, 400, 800.
6 Reserve Prices for Ordered Buyers
We continue the study of the problem of setting reserve prices in ESP auctions with an extra
constraint: we assume that the order among the reserves is exogenous. In other words, given an
ordering pi : [n]→ [n] and distributions F1, . . . , Fn for the buyers’ value, we want to choose reserve
prices p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) to maximize ESP(p) while ensuring that ppi(1) ≤ . . . ≤ ppi(n). This
problem can be written as follows
ESP∗(pi) = max
p
ESP(p)
s.t. ppi(1) ≤ . . . ≤ ppi(n) .
(Ordered-ESP)
In what follows, without loss of generality, we assume that pi(i) = i, i ∈ [n]. That is, we would like
to have p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn. We note that as shown by Paes Leme et al. (2016) and Roughgarden
and Wang (2016), the problem of optimizing reserve prices in the ESP auctions is NP-complete.
Here, we show that this problem becomes tractable when we fix the order over reserve prices.
The motivation for studying this problem is threefold. First, there are often good heuristics to
choose an ordering among buyers, such as ordering by the mean of the distribution, the monopoly
price, the monopoly revenue, or the coefficient of variation. Second, the sellers might have reasons
to set lower reserves for some buyers, for example, as a consequence of the deals and contracts that
they might have signed. Finally, one can see order-based reserve prices as a technique to enhance
the performance of the prior pricing heuristics (like, for example, Ronen (2001), Roughgarden and
Wang (2016), and Paes Leme et al. (2016)). That is, one can enhance the revenue of a pricing
heuristic by finding the best reserve prices that respect the order suggested by the heuristic. In
Section 7, we show empirically that such an approach improves the revenue of these heuristics
significantly.
We now focus on Problem Ordered-ESP. We show that this problem can be solved effectively.
I.e., given a fixed ordering of the reserves, the optimal reserves can be computed in polynomial time.
To be able to reason about computation, it is useful to assume that the value distributions have
support in a finite discrete set. The result generalizes to continuous distributions by discretizing
the distributions and applying the algorithm.
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Our approach is based on dynamic programming (DP) method. We define DPi(p) as the
expected revenue of the ESP auction when only buyers 1, 2, . . . , i participate in the auction and
their reserve prices satisfy the following constraint: p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pi ≤ p. Let F˜1(y) = P[v1 < y]
(this is slightly different from F1(y) = P[v1 ≤ y]). For i ≥ 1, DPi(p) can be computed recursively
as follows:
∀i ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ V : DPi+1(p) = max
y≤p
{
F˜i+1(y)DPi(y) + (1− F˜i+1(y))R≥i+1(y)
}
, (16)
∀p ∈ V : DP0(p) = 0
where R≥i+1(y) is the revenue of the ESP auction when
1. only buyers 1, 2, . . . , i+1 participate in the auction,
2. reserve price of all these i+ 1 buyers is equal to y,
3. the value distribution of buyer i+ 1 is F≥yi+1 where F
≥y
i+1 is the distribution of Fi+1 conditioned
on the value being at least y, and
4. the value distributions of buyers j ∈ [i] is Fj .
To understand the DP, observe that in the first term of the r.h.s. of Equation (16), buyer i + 1
cannot clear his reserve price y, i.e., vi+1 < y. Then, considering the fact that p1 ≤ . . . ≤ pi+1 = y,
the revenue of the ESP auction in that case is equal to DPi(y). In the second term of the r.h.s.,
buyer i + 1 clears his reserve price, i.e., vi+1 ≥ y. In that case, the revenue of the ESP auction is
equal to R≥i+1(y), as any buyer j ∈ [i] cannot win the item if his value is less than y. That is, the
effective reserve price for any buyer j ∈ [i] is y.
In the following, we show that how to use the DP in (16) to compute the optimal reserve
prices of Problem Ordered-ESP. To present our result, we need a few more definitions. Let Vi be
the support of buyer i’s value distribution and let V = ∪i∈[n]Vi be the support of buyers’ value.
Define p?i , i ∈ [n], as the optimal reserve price of buyer i in Problem Ordered-ESP. Further, for any
i ∈ [n− 1], let
OPi+1(p) = arg max
y≤p
{
F˜i+1(y)DPi(y) + (1− F˜i+1(y))R≥i+1(y)
}
. (17)
That is, OPi+1(p) is the value of y ≤ p that maximizes the expression in DPi+1(p); see Equation
(16).
We are now ready to present our result.
Theorem 13 (Optimal Solution of Problem Ordered-ESP). Without loss of generality, assume that
pi(i) = i for any i ∈ [n]. Let p¯ = max{y : y ∈ V }, and let p?i be the optimal reserve price for buyer
i in the Problem Ordered-ESP. Then,
p?n = OPn(p¯)
p?i = OPi(p
?
i+1) ∀i ∈ [n− 1]
ESP∗(pi) = DPn(p¯).
Here, DPn(p¯) and OPi(·) are respectively defined in Equations (16) and (17), ESP∗(pi) is the op-
timal value of Problem Ordered-ESP. The optimal reserve prices {p?i }i∈[n] can be computed in time
O(n4 |V |2), where V is the support of buyers’ value.
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Theorem 13 shows a simple polynomial time algorithm for computing the optimal order-based
reserve prices recursively.
The proof of Theorem 13 is presented in the appendix. The proof at a high level is as follows.
Except for the runtime, the rest of the theorem follows from the definition of OPi(·), DPi(·), R≥i (·),
and the recursive equations given in (16) and (17). The runtime is derived by characterizing the
complexity of computing R≥i (y) and using the DP in Equation (16). We show that for each i ∈ [n]
and y ∈ V , R≥i (y) can be computed in O(n3 |V |). Thus, we construct a look-up table that includes
R
≥
i (y) for any i ∈ [n] and y ∈ V in O(n4 |V |2) time. With the look-up table and the DP presented
in (16), the runtime of the dynamic programming algorithm is O(n4 |V |2).
7 Empirical and Numerical Studies
In this section, we evaluate our order-based reserve price optimization method in two settings. In
the first setting we use synthetic data and in the second setting, we use the real auction dataset
from Google’s advertising exchange. The dataset is fully anonymized and subsampled. We begin
by describing the orderings over reserve prices that we consider for this study.
Order over Reserve Prices: We consider six orderings for reserve prices. The first four
orderings are based on four important pricing heuristics for ESP auctions that have been proposed
in the literature: monopoly reserve prices and heuristics proposed by Ronen (2001), Roughgarden
and Wang (2016), and Paes Leme et al. (2016). We later describe these heuristics in detail. In
these four orders, ESP auctions follow the order of reserve prices computed by these heuristics 12.
The last two orderings are based on average and coefficient of variation (CV) of submitted bids
of the buyers, where CV of a buyer is the standard deviation of his submitted bids divided by his
average bids. Precisely, in the orderings based on the average (respectively CV) of bids, buyers
with higher average bids (respectively CVs) are assigned higher reserve prices. As stated earlier,
these last two orderings are motivated by Golrezaei et al. (2017).
We now explain these pricing heuristics.
Heuristics. Since the goal is to evaluate ordered-based ESP in datasets, it is best to explain
the pricing heuristics by describing how to compute the reserve prices in them given a data set of
K ESP auctions, with a vector of submitted bids for each auction. Let bki be the submitted bid
of buyer i in auction k ∈ [K], and, let bk(2) denote the second highest submitted bid in auction k.
Finally, let Wi be the subset of these K auctions in which buyer i submits the highest bid.
- Monopoly Reserve Prices (M): The M reserve price of buyer i is given by
pMi = arg maxy
∑
k∈[K]
y · I(bki ≥ y) . (18)
Monopoly reserve prices are inspired by their role in the design of the optimal auction (My-
erson 1981). In particular, the monopoly price is the optimal reserve price when there is only
a single buyer in the auction.
12For instance, if ESP follows the order of the monopoly reserve prices, and if the monopoly reserves are pM1 <
pM2 < . . . < p
M
n , in Problem Ordered-ESP, we let pi(i) = i for i ∈ [n] to ensure that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn.
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- Roughgarden and Wang’s Reserve Prices (RW): The RW reserve price for buyer i is
computed as:
pRWi = arg maxy
∑
k∈Wi
(y − bk(2))+ · I(bki > y) , (19)
where (y)+ is y when y ≥ 0, and zero otherwise. Roughgarden and Wang (2016) show that
the best of pRWi and zero reserve price obtains at least half of the optimal revenue.
- Ronen’s Reserve Prices (R): The R reserve price of buyer i is computed as:
pRi = arg maxy
∑
k∈Wi
y · I(bki ≥ y) . (20)
This heuristic is proposed by Ronen (2001). The difference between Ronen’s and monopoly
reserve prices is the set of auctions that each considers. To compute pRi , we only consider
the set of auctions Wi in which buyer i has the highest submitted bid. To compute p
M
i , we
consider all the auctions.
- Paes Leme et al.’s Reserve Prices (PPV): The PPV reserve price of buyer i is given
by:
pPPVi = arg maxy
∑
k∈Wi
max(y, bk(2)) · I(bki ≥ y) . (21)
The PPV reserve prices are optimal when one is constrained to run a lazy second price auction.
7.1 First Setting: Synthetic Dataset
We assume that there are 10 buyers attending the ESP auction, where the buyer i’s value is drawn
independently from a lognormal distribution Logn(µi, σi)
13. Here, µi and σi are independently
drawn from a uniform distribution in [0,1]. We note that lognormal distributions have proved to
be a good fit for the distribution of valuations of advertisers in online advertising markets; see, for
example, Edelman et al. (2007), Edelman and Schwarz (2006), Xiao et al. (2009), Balseiro et al.
(2014), and Golrezaei et al. (2017).
As discussed earlier, we consider six orderings over reserve prices. The first four orderings
are based on the four pricing heuristics, and the last two orders are based on the Coefficient of
Variation (CV) and average of the submitted bids of buyers. Table 5 shows the expected revenue of
the ESP auctions as a percentage of the optimal revenue. To compute these numbers, we consider
200 problem instances, where each problem instance is associated with a random set of parameters
µ = (µ1, . . . , µ10) and σ = (σ1, . . . , σ10). For each instance, we run 5000 auctions, i.e., draw 5000
independent values of vi ∼ Logn(µi, σi), and compute the expected revenue of the ESP auction
across these auctions. This results in 200 values, one for each problem instance. The reported
numbers in the table are obtained by taking the average over these 200 values.
We now discuss the results in the table.
13Given that random variable X ∼ Logn(µi, σi), then the mean and standard deviation of the variable’s natural
logarithm are respectively µi and σi.
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• ESP: The second row of the table contains the expected revenue of ESP auctions as a per-
centage of the optimal revenue Opt, where the reserve prices come from M’s, RW’s, R’s and
PPV’s heuristics. The columns corresponding to CV and Average (AVG) of bids are not well
defined here because these only define orderings, and not any reserve prices: so ESP auctions
with OR-CV or OR-AVG as reserve prices is not well defined.
• OR-ESP: The third row of the table contains the percentage of optimal revenue obtained by
the expected revenue of the optimal order-based ESP. The columns refer to the percentage
obtained when using the ordering from M, RW, R, PPV, OR-CV and OR-AVG. Note that the
expected revenue of the optimal order-based ESP, namely ESP∗(pi) defined in Problem Ordered-
ESP, is computed using our DP formulation.
• Rev Gain: The fourth row is just the percentage increase in the third row when compared to
the second row. Precisely, for each pricing heuristic, the Rev Gain is equal to 100·OR-ESP−ESPESP .
We observe that the OR-ESP auctions can improve the revenue of these prominent pricing
heuristics by up to 5.89%, where the highest gain happens for RW’s reserve prices. The revenue
gain of OR-ESP auctions is shown in the last row of the table. In addition, regardless of the
order that we imposed, the performance of OR-ESP is better than that of the ESP auctions under
the four pricing heuristics. As another observation, OR-AVG and OR-CV respectively obtain
96.8% and 98.4% of the optimal revenue, confirming the good performance of the order-based price
optimization for ESP auctions. Finally, these results show that the ESP auctions can perform much
better than our theoretical revenue bounds.
Heuristics M RW R PPV OR-CV OR-AVG
ESP 93.2 93.3 95.7 93.3 - -
OR-ESP 96.2 98.8 98.8 97.8 98.4 96.8
Rev Gain in % 3.22 5.89 3.24 4.82 - -
Table 5: The expected revenue of ESP and OR-ESP on synthetic data as a percentage of the optimal revenue. The
standard error of all the numbers is less than 0.1%.
7.2 Second Setting: Real Auction Dataset
While using synthetic data makes our study replicable, it only allows us to evaluate the performance
of the OR-ESP auction in a stylized environment where all the buyers participate in all the auctions
and their valuations are independent of each other. To overcome this issue, in this section, we assess
the performance of the OR-ESP auction in a more realistic environment where these assumptions
do not necessarily hold. In particular, we use a dataset from Google’s advertising exchange that
runs second price auctions with reserve, and we show that the OR-ESP auctions have a good
performance despite the fact that submitted bids in our dataset are correlated across buyers. We
work with a dataset that has impression level granularity (i.e., data for each auction). We perform
our evaluation on four ad slots that have the highest traffic volume.
We randomly divide the auctions for each ad slot into two sets with equal size, creating training
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and test dataset. We use the training dataset to optimize the reserve prices.14 We then evaluate
the optimized reserve prices on the test dataset. Precisely, we randomly sample 20% of the test
dataset 200 times.15 We then compute the revenue of the ESP and OR-ESP auctions on each of
the sampled dataset, and take the average.
To compute the reserve prices in OR-ESP auctions, we use our DP formulation, provided in
Equation (16). To do so, we need to compute R≥i (y) for any i ∈ [n] and y ∈ V ; see the precise
definition of R≥i (y) right after Equation (16). (As stated earlier, without loss of generality, we
assume that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn.) To compute R≥i (y), we consider all the auctions in the training
dataset in which buyer i submits a bid greater than y, and set the bids of buyers i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n
in these auctions to zero. Then, considering the submitted bids of buyers 1 to i in these auctions,
we compute the revenue of the ESP, assuming that the reserve price of buyers 1, 2, . . . , i is set to
y. The average revenue of ESP in these auctions is R≥i (y).
Table 6 shows revenue obtained by ESP and OR-ESP auctions, for each of the top four ad slots,
as the percentage of revenue of the second price auction with no reserve.16 The meaning of the
rows in Table 6 are similar to what we have in Table 5, with the only differences being
1. Table 6 has four different subtables, one for each ad slot. If one is looking to compare synthetic
and real datasets’ results, we should compare Table 5 with each of these 4 subtables in Table 6.
2. The percentages in Table 6 are w.r.t. the second price auction with no reserves, instead of
being w.r.t. the optimal auction, and hence the entries in each of the subtables of Table 6
are larger than 100.
We note here that our paper is the first work that evaluates and compares the performance
of these prominent pricing heuristics in a real environment. Even before getting into how our DP
formulation improves these heuristics significantly, there are already some interesting takeaways.
For example, while it is clear that introducing reserve prices to second price auctions increases its
revenue, Table 6 shows that in real data, the increase can be quite significant. For instance, in ad
slot 1, the revenue of the ESP auction under all four pricing heuristics is more than 2 times the
revenue of the second price auction with no reserve. For other ad slots, revenue of the ESP auction
under the pricing heuristics is 28-86 percentage more than that of second price auction with no
reserve. As another observation, PPV’s prices outperforms other pricing heuristics in most of the
ad slots.
The main take-away is that in each ad slot, and for every pricing heuristic, the OR-ESP auction
(obtained from our DP formulation) outperforms the ESP auction. This is particularly interesting
as it empirically establishes that OR-ESP outperforms ESP even when the bidders’ distributions
are correlated in real world setting. Furthermore, the revenue gains are often significant, reaching
up to 8.75%.
14We only optimize the reserve prices of the top 10 buyers with the highest winning rate. This is due to the thinness
of the auctions: i.e., the participation rate of other buyers is rather small. For these small buyers, we replace their
bids with zero. Retaining the small buyers yields similar results too.
15The entire dataset contains a sample from over 100,000 real world auctions. Each sample of 20% of the test
dataset accounts for more than 20000 auctions.
16On real auction data, evaluating the optimal revenue is very challenging, as buyers’ values are correlated and
value distributions may be irregular.
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Ad Slot 1 2
Heuristics M RW R PPV OR-CV OR-AVG M RW R PPV OR-CV OR-AVG
ESP 217.8 228.6 213.9 228.4 - - 150.7 141.5 146.4 151.6 - -
OR-ESP 218.9 228.7 219.6 228.8 173.7 227.8 151.1 146.4 147.7 152.0 142.8 136.1
Rev Gain in % 0.51 0.04 2.66 0.17 - - 0.27 3.46 0.89 0.26 - -
Ad Slot 3 4
Heuristics M RW R PPV OR-CV OR-AVG M RW R PPV OR-CV OR-AVG
ESP 154.7 128.0 147.8 154.9 - - 186.2 175.4 181.0 186.5 - -
OR-ESP 154.9 139.2 148.3 154.9 143.2 151.9 188.1 183.1 187.0 188.1 174.2 173.6
Rev Gain in % 0.13 8.75 0.34 0.0 - - 1.02 4.39 3.31 0.86 - -
Table 6: The expected revenue of ESP and OR-ESP on real auction data as a percentage of the revenue of second
price auction with no reserve. The standard error of all the numbers is less than 0.1%.
8 Conclusion
We improve the best-known performance guarantee on the revenue of two simple and commonly
used auction formats, ESP auctions and SPMs. For each auction format, we present two revenue
bounds. Our first revenue bound is universal: it is valid for any number of buyers n. Our second
revenue bound improves our universal bound via taking into account the number of buyers in the
auctions: we show that when the number of buyers is small, ESP auctions and SPMs get a higher
fraction of the optimal revenue. This justifies the wide-spread use of the ESP auctions in advertising
markets where the number of buyers in each auction is rather small.
We then show that in the ESP auctions, reserve prices can be optimized in polynomial time once
we fix their order. Such an order could be obtained from the buyer’s bidding behavior and/or the
deals/contracts that the seller has with the buyer, or be obtained from existing heuristics for reserve
price optimization. Via both empirical and numerical analysis, we show that the ESP auctions with
exogenous orders perform well and can improve the performance of prominent pricing heuristics by
up to 8.75%.
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A Other Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 9
Lemma 9 (restated) . Let Zτ be the number of buyers with vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ ; that is, Zτ = |{i ∈ [n], vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ}|.
Then,
P[Zτ = 0] ≤ qn(s(τ)) ≤ e−s(τ) (22)
2P[Zτ = 0] + P[Zτ = 1] ≤ rn(s(τ)) ≤ (2 + s(τ))e−s(τ) , (23)
where qn(y) =
(
1− y
n
)n
and rn(y) = 2
(
1− y
n
)n
+ y
(
1− y
n
)n−1
.
Proof. Define zi = I(vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ), where I(·) is an indicator function. Then, Zτ can be written as follows
Zτ =
∑
i∈[n]
zi ,
where zi’s are independent 0/1 Bernoulli random variables with E[zi] = si(τ). This implies that E[Zτ ] =
∑
i∈[n] E[zi] =∑
i∈[n] si(τ) = s(τ). Then,
P[Zτ = 0] =
∏
i∈[n]
P[zi = 0] =
∏
i∈[n]
(1− si(τ)) ≤
(
1−
∑
i∈[n] si(τ)
n
)n
≤ e−
∑
i∈[n] si(τ) = e−s(τ) ,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that for any sequence a1, a2, . . . , an, we have
∏
i∈[n] ai ≤
(∑
i∈[n] ai
n
)n
.
By definition of qn(·), the above equation leads to Equation (22), which is the first desired result.
Next, we will show Equation (23). We start by observing that the l.h.s. of this equation can be written as a
symmetric polynomial in s1(τ), . . . , sn(τ), namely,
2P[Zτ = 0] + P[Zτ = 1] = 2
∏
i∈[n]
(1− si(τ)) +
∑
i∈[n]
si(τ)
∏
j 6=i
(1− sj(τ)) .
In the rest of the proof, to ease the notation, we denote si(τ), i ∈ [n], by si. Define polynomial
Pn(s1, . . . , sn) := 2
∏
i∈[n]
(1− si) +
∑
i∈[n]
si
∏
j 6=i
(1− sj) .
To provide an upper bound on 2P[Zτ = 0] + P[Zτ = 1], we show that subject to the constraint
∑
i∈[n] si = s(τ), the
value of the polynomial Pn is maximized when s1 = s2 = · · · = sn = s(τ)/n.
To prove this, consider a point s = (s1, . . . , sn) such that
∑
i∈[n] si = s(τ). Pick any pair of coordinates (without
loss of generality, 1 and 2) and consider increasing one and decreasing the other. Now, note that P (s1 + δ, s2 −
δ, s3, . . . , sn) is a quadratic function of δ. It is not difficult to verify that the quadratic coefficient is negative. Then,
considering the fact that P is symmetric, it follows that the maximum in this direction is achieved at δ such that
s1 + δ = s2 − δ, i.e. when the two coordinates are equal, for every profile of values for the remaining coordinates.
Since this argument holds for any pair of coordinates, it follows that P (s) is maximized when all coordinates are
equal, i.e., si = s(τ)/n for i ∈ [n].
So far, we have established that
2P[Zτ = 0] + P[Zτ = 1] ≤ Pn
(s(τ)
n
, . . . ,
s(τ)
n
)
= rn(s(τ)) ,
where the equality follows from definition of Pn and rn. The above equation gives us the first desired inequality in
(23). For the second inequality, observe that:
Pn
(s(τ)
n
, . . . ,
s(τ)
n
)
= Pn+1
(s(τ)
n
, . . . ,
s(τ)
n
, 0
)
≤ Pn+1
( s(τ)
n+ 1
, . . . ,
s(τ)
n+ 1
,
s(τ)
n+ 1
)
.
In particular,
Pn
(s(τ)
n
, . . . ,
s(τ)
n
)
≤ lim
k→∞
Pk
(s(τ)
k
, . . . ,
s(τ)
k
)
= (2 + s(τ))e−s(τ) .
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 10 (restated). Functions y 7→ 1
y
(2 − rn(y)) and y 7→ 1y (x + 1 − qn(y)) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] for
every positive integer n and every x ≥ 0, where qn(y) = (1− yn )n and rn(y) = 2(1− yn )n + y(1− yn )n−1. Further, the
limiting functions are also decreasing, i.e., functions y 7→ 1
y
(2 − (2 + y)e−y) and y 7→ 1
y
(x + 1 − e−y) are decreasing
in y ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [x, 1].
Proof. The proof follows from taking derivatives and showing that they are negative in the desired ranges. We first
show that functions y 7→ 1
y
(2 − (2 + y)e−y) and y 7→ 1
y
(x + 1 − e−y) are decreasing respectively in y ∈ [0, 1] and
y ∈ [x, 1]. For the first function, note that d
(
1
y
(2−(2+y)e−y)
)
dy
= 1
y2
(2ye−y+y2e−y+2e−y−2) ≤ 0 due to the inequality
ey ≥ 1 + y + y2
2
. For the second function,
∂
(
1
y
(x+ 1− e−y)
)
∂y
=
ye−y − x− 1 + e−y
y2
≤ 0 ,
where the inequality holds because 1 + y ≤ ey and x ≥ 0.
We next show that functions y 7→ 1
y
(2−rn(y)) and y 7→ 1y (x+1−qn(y)) are decreasing in y ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [x, 1]
respectively for every positive integer n and every x ≥ 0, where qn(·) and rn(·) are defined in Lemma 9. While taking
derivatives below, we assume n ≥ 2. It is straightforward to verify for the case of n = 1.
By definition of rn(·), the derivative of the first function is given by
d
(
1
y
(2− rn(y))
)
dy
=
(1− y
n
)n−2
(
y2 n−1
n
+ 2y(1− y
n
) + 2(1− y
n
)2 − 2
(1− y
n
)n−2
)
y2
. (24)
Note that the derivative is non-positive if
y2
n− 1
2n
+ y(1− y
n
) + (1− y
n
)2 = 1 +
n− 2
n
y +
(n− 1)(n− 2)
2
y2
n2
≤ 1
(1− y
n
)n−2
, (25)
where the equality follows from a simple algebra. In the following, we will verify the inequality. This shows that
1
y
(2− rn(y)) is decreasing in y. For any y ∈ [0, 1), we have
1
(1− y
n
)n−2
≥
(
1 +
y
n
+
y2
n2
)n−2
≥ 1 + (n− 2) y
n
+
(
(n− 2)(n− 3)
2
+ (n− 2)
)
y2
n2
= 1 +
n− 2
n
y +
(n− 1)(n− 2)
2
y2
n2
.
The last equation is the desired result.
We next show that function 1
y
(x+ 1− qn(y)) is decreasing in y. The derivative of this function w.r.t. y is given
by
∂
(
1
y
(x+ 1− qn(y))
)
∂y
=
−x− 1 + y(1− y
n
)n−1 + (1− y
n
)n
y2
=
(1− y
n
)n−1
(
− x+1
(1− y
n
)n−1 + y + 1− yn
)
y2
.
To show that
∂
(
1
y
(x+1−qn(y))
)
∂y
≤ 0, we verify that − x+1
(1− y
n
)n−1 + y + 1− yn ≤ 0. For y < 1 and x ≥ 0, we have
x+ 1
(1− y
n
)n−1
≥ (x+ 1)
(
1 +
y
n
)n−1
≥ (x+ 1)
(
1 +
n− 1
n
y
)
≥ 1 + n− 1
n
y .
The last inequality implies that 1
y
(x+ 1− qn(y)) is decreasing in y.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 11
Theorem 11 (SPM with a Finite Number of Buyers, restated). There exist reserve prices p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn)
such that SPMn(p) ≥ Optn ·maxk ( 1LP-SPM(n,k) ) for every positive integer k, where
LP-SPM(n, k) = max
w
∑
i∈[k]
wi
s.t.
k∑
i=j+1
wi
sj
si
≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [k − 1]
k∑
i=1
wi
1− qn(si)
si
≤ 1 ,
wi ≥ 0 . ∀i ∈ [k]
(LP-SPM-n)
Here, si = i/k, i ∈ [k], and qn(y) =
(
1− y
n
)n
.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5, we consider the posted price mechanism that chooses the best of Myersonian
and uniform pricing rules. We then show that the revenue of this mechanism is at least maxk (
1
LP-SPM(n,k)
) fraction
of the optimal revenue where LP-SPM(n, k) is defined in Theorem 11.
By definition of wi’s in (6), the objective function of Problem LP-SPM-n is the optimal revenue. In addition,
without loss of generality, we normalize the revenue of the posted price mechanism that chooses the best of Myersonian
and uniform pricing rules to one; that is, max(MP,UP) = 1. Thus, to show the result, it suffices to verify the
constraints.
The First Set of Constraints: Define Tx = inf{τ : s(τ) ≤ x}, x ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, with a slight abuse of
notation, let UPx be the revenue of the posted price mechanism that posts a uniform price of Tx for all buyers. By
definition of the uniform posted price mechanism, we have UP ≥ maxx∈[0,1] UPx. Then, by Equation (9), and our
assumption that max(MP,UP) = 1, we have
1 ≥ UPx ≥
∫ Tx
0
xdτ =
∫ Tx
0
x
s(τ)
s(τ)dτ .
In the following, we set x to sj = j/k. Then, we get
1 ≥
∫ Tx
0
sj
s(τ)
s(τ)dτ ≥
k∑
i=j+1
∫ τi−1
τi
sj
s(τ)
s(τ)dτ ≥
k∑
i=j+1
wi
sj
si
,
where the first inequality follows from the monotonicity of s(·) and definition of τi’s and Tx. The second inequality
follows from definition of wi and the fact that s(·) is weakly decreasing. Note that the above equation verifies the
first set of constraints.
Second Constraint: Let m(τ) be the probability that the Myersonian posted price mechanism sells with price
at least τ . Then, by construction of the prices, t′i’s, in this mechanism, we have m(τ) = 1− P[Zτ = 0], where Zτ is
the number of buyers that satisfy vi ≥ t′i ≥ τ . This implies that
1 ≥ MP =
∫ ∞
0
(1− P[Zτ = 0])dτ ≥
∫ ∞
0
(1− qn(s(τ)))dτ
=
∫ ∞
0
(1− qn(s(τ)))
s(τ)
s(τ)dτ ≥
k∑
i=1
wi
1− qn(si)
si
,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 9 and third inequality follows from Lemma 10 where we show 1−qn(y)
y
is decreasing in y. The above equation gives the second constraint, and completes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 13
Theorem 13 (Optimal Solution of Problem Ordered-ESP, restated). Without loss of generality, assume
that pi(i) = i for any i ∈ [n]. Let p¯ = max{y : y ∈ V }, and let p?i be the optimal reserve price for buyer i in the
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Problem Ordered-ESP. Then,
p?n = OPn(p¯)
p?i = OPi(p
?
i+1) ∀i ∈ [n− 1]
ESP∗(pi) = DPn(p¯) ,
where
∀i ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ V : DPi+1(p) = max
y≤p
{
F˜i+1(y)DPi(y) + (1− F˜i+1(y))R≥i+1(y)
}
,
∀i ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ V : OPi+1(p) = arg max
y≤p
{
F˜i+1(y)DPi(y) + (1− F˜i+1(y))R≥i+1(y)
}
,
∀p ∈ V : DP0(p) = 0 ,
∀i > 0, y ∈ V : F˜i(y) = P[vi < y] ,
and ESP∗(pi) is the optimal value of Problem Ordered-ESP. The optimal reserve prices {p?i }i∈[n] can be computed
in time O(n4 |V |2), where V is the support of buyers’ value.
Proof. By definition, DPn(p¯) is the expected revenue of the ESP auction when buyers 1, 2, . . . , n participate in
the auction and their reserve prices satisfy the following equation: p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pn ≤ p¯. This implies that
ESP∗(pi) = DPn(p¯) and reserve price of buyer n is p?n = OPn(p¯). Similarly, the reserve price of buyer n − 1 is
equal to OPn−1(p?n) because by constraints of Problem Ordered-ESP, p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ p?n. Likewise, it follows that
p?i = OPi(p
?
i+1) for any i ∈ [n− 1].
To establish the runtime, note that the optimal value of this problem, ESP∗(pi), is equal to DPn(p¯). To compute
DPn(p¯), we have to evaluate R
≥
i (y) for any i ∈ [n] and y ∈ V . Lemma 14 establishes the complexity of computing
R
≥
i (y) for any given i, y to be O(n
3|V |). Using this we are able to construct a look-up table that contains R≥i (y) for
all values of i ∈ [n] and y ∈ V in O(n4|V |2). Having access to this look-up table, we next show that the complexity of
computing DPn(p¯) is O(n
4|V |2). To compute DPn(p¯), we need to evaluate DPi(y) for any i ∈ [n] and y ∈ V . Further,
computing DPi(y) involves evaluating the maximum over O(|V |) values. Thus, by having access to the look-up table,
we can compute DPn(p¯) in O(n|V |2). Considering the fact that the look-up table can be calculated in O(n4|V |2),
the overall complexity of computing DPn(p¯) is O(n|V |2) +O(n4|V |2) = O(n4|V |2).
Lemma 14. For any y ∈ V and i ∈ [n], the quantity R≥i (y) can be computed in O(n3|V |).
Proof. Proof of Lemma 14: Observe that the complexity of R≥i (y) is increasing in i. Thus, in the following, we
present the complexity of computing R≥n (y).
Decompose the probability space into events of the following types. Throughout the proof, when more than one
buyer wins, i.e., when more than one buyer has the highest submitted bid, we choose the lexicographically largest as
the winner. Followed by this, if more than one buyer acts as the price-setter, we declare the lexicographically largest
as the price-setter.
• Type-1: Winner is priced at y.
• Type-2p: Winner is priced at p > y, where p is the second highest buyer’s bid (which also equals his value).
In a Type-1 event, the revenue is exactly y. So, the total revenue contribution from this event is y.P[Type-1 event].
Type-1 event occurs when either no bidder i ( 6= n) has a value strictly larger than y, in which case bidder n is the
winner (even when there is a tie, due to our lexicographically largest tie-breaking), or when exactly one bidder i ( 6= n)
has a value strictly larger than y, and bidder n has value equal to y. The probability of these two events is expressed
below:
P[Type-1 event] =
∑
i∈[n−1]
[
(1− Fi(y)) ·
( ∏
j /∈{i,n}
Fj(y)
)
· fn(y)
1− F˜n(y)
]
+
∏
j /∈{n}
Fj(y) .
In a Type-2p event, the revenue is p · P[Type-2p event]. So, the total revenue contribution from all the Type-2p
events, p ∈ V , is ∑p∈V p ·P[Type-2p event]. To compute the probability of a Type 2p event: note that it can happen
when
• there is either exactly one buyer with value strictly larger than p and at least one buyer with value at p, or,
• there are no buyers with value strictly above p and at least two buyers with value equal to p.
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The event of having exactly one buyer above p and at least one buyer with value at p can be split further as
follows. Let i be the winner, and let j be the price-setter.
1. i 6= n, j 6= n. In this case, given our reverse lexicographic tie-breaking, for j to be price-setter, we need: vi > p,
vj = p, vk ≤ p for k < j (k 6= i) and vk < p for k > j (k 6= i). The probability of this event is:
p11 =
∑
i∈[n−1]
[
(1− Fi(p)) · F˜n(p)
1− F˜n(y)
·
∑
j /∈{i,n}
{
fj(p) ·
( ∏
k<j,k/∈{i}
Fk(p)
)
·
( ∏
k>j,k/∈{i,n}
F˜k(p)
)}]
.
2. i 6= n, j = n. We need vi > p, vn = p, and vk ≤ p for k < n (k 6= i). The probability of this event is:
p12 =
∑
i∈[n−1]
[
(1− Fi(p)) · fn(p)
1− F˜n(y)
·
( ∏
k<n,k/∈{i}
Fk(p)
)]
.
3. i = n, j 6= n. We need vn > p, vj = p, vk ≤ p for k < j (k 6= n) and vk < p for k > j (k 6= n). The probability
of this event is:
p13 =
1− Fn(p)
1− F˜n(y)
·
∑
j /∈{n}
[
fj(p) ·
( ∏
k<j,k/∈{i}
Fk(p)
)
·
( ∏
k>j,k/∈{n}
F˜k(p)
)]
.
The event of there being no buyers with value strictly above p and at least two buyers with a value equal to p
can be split further as follows. Let i be the winner and j be the price-setter (and therefore both have value at p).
1. i 6= n (note that j < i, because otherwise by tie-breaking we would have declared j as the winner). We need
vi = p , vj = p, vk ≤ p for k < j and vk < p for k > j (k 6= i). The probability of this event is:
p21 =
∑
i∈[n−1]
[
fi(p) ·
∑
j<i
{
fj(p) ·
(∏
k<j
Fk(p)
)
·
( ∏
k>j,k/∈{i,n}
F˜k(p)
)
· F˜n(p)
1− F˜n(y)
}]
.
2. i = n. We need vn = p, vj = p, vk ≤ p for k < j and vk < p for k > j (k 6= n). The probability of this event is:
p22 =
fn(p)
1− F˜n(y)
·
∑
j<n
[
fj(p) ·
(∏
k<j
Fk(p)
)
·
( ∏
k>j,k/∈{n}
F˜k(p)
)]
.
For each of these five probabilities {p11, p12, p13, p21, p22}, it is straightforward to observe, given the double
summation over i, j, that we are adding over at most n2 terms, and that each of these terms involves computing a
product of at most n terms. Thus, computing the probability for any Type-2p event, namely p11+p12+p13+p21+p22,
for any given p takes O(n3) time. Thus, computing the type-2p probability for every p ∈ V takes O(n3 |V |) time, and
as a result, R≥n (y) can be computed in O(n
3 |V |) time.
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